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ABSTRACT 
The financial incentive structure of today's health maintenance organizations addresses certain 
problems attributed to fee-for-service medical care, but at a theoretical level it does not induce 
optimal provider behavior. Health maintenance insurance--a combined package of medical, 
morbidity/disability, and life insurance--encourages providers to compete for the health dollar, and 
not simply the medical care dollar, thereby remedying deficiencies in prepayment and promoting true 
health maintenance. The principle underlying health maintenance insurance emphasizes the need to 
search for effective means of preventing disability, morbidity, and premature death. 
Introduction 
Prepaid comprehensive health care, as embodied in the Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO), is often advocated as a solution to deficiencies in the delivery 
of  personal medical care and as a means of bringing the spiraling costs of care under 
control. Proponents argue that fee-for-service, the predominant mode of payment, 
encourages or at minimum tolerates incorrect and often excessive use of  medical 
resources, By altering the economic incentive structure and making providers 
responsible for their patients' long-term medical needs, prepayment is intended to 
introduce economic efficiency into the delivery of  effective health services (e.g. 
Ellwood et al., 1971). 
Long the fair-haired child of the academic health community, prepaid com- 
prehensive care entered the federal policy arena with debate which culminated in 
passage of the HMO Act of  1973. HMOs were offered to Congress as a competitive 
market alternative to growing regulation in the health field, but the regulatory maze 
written into the legislation and the paucity of  start-up appropriations emasculated 
the HMO movement (Starr, 1976). Recent amendments to the act have not 
significantly reversed the damage, but attraction to the idea has reemerged in the 
policy debate on national health insurance (Enthoven, 1977). 
Conceptually, prepayment successfully addresses many of the weaknesses of  fee- 
for-service; and recent empirical evidence indicates that these conceptual advantages 
* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 105th Annual Meeting of the American Public 
Health Association, Washington, D.C., October 30--November 3, 1977. 
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have frequently translated into real benefits in practice (e.g. Roemer and Shonick, 
1973; Weil, 1976; Luft, 1978a). However, even in theory prepayment does not 
produce the set of economic incentives which would be optimally structured to 
produce health maintenance. The purpose of this paper is to note the deficiencies 
remaining in the concept of prepaid comprehensive care, as regards economic 
considerations, and to suggest a simple modification which would create a 
theoretically complete set of economic incentives to encourage true health 
maintenance. 
A couple of points merit emphasis at the outset. First, I am concerned here 
exclusively with the economic environment in which care is demanded and delivered. 
I do not mean to imply that economic factors are the only factors influencing 
medical decisions, nor that they are the most important. Economic considerations 
constitute only one element in a constellation of influences including technical, 
social, ethical, and other professional considerations. My concern is that the 
economic environment be such as to support and encourage outcomes deemed 
socially desirable. Thus, this analysis focuses on the marginal effects of economic 
incentives--the incremental effects one would anticipate theoretically when all other 
factors are held constant. 
Second, I beg the reader's indulgence of a few generalizations made in the 
following pages. Their use seemed consistent with the objective of conveying the 
principal idea simply and concisely. The assumptions underlying the concept of 
health maintenance insurance and its implementation can be reasonably discussed 
only on a foundation of shared basic understanding of the concept itself. 
Before introducing that concept, I will briefly review the economic incentives 
implicit in both fee-for-service and prepayment, z 
Economic Incentives in Fee-for-Service 
The primary argument in favor of fee-for-service medicine is a conventional 
economic market argument: out-of-pocket charges deter consumers from 
demanding care which they value less than the resources used in providing that care. 
In this view, the absence of direct out-of-pocket financial responsibility encourages 
overutilization (wastage) of scarce resources. Critics of fee-for-service respond that 
consumers may be ignorant and myopic about their health, and certainly about 
specific medical care needs. Out-of-pocket charges may exacerbate a tendency to 
underutilize primary and preventive care services, resulting in serious--and more 
expensive--medical problems later on. These critics argue that barriers to the 
consumer's initiation of demand, such as out-of-pocket fees, ought to be eliminated, 
with the restriction of demand being accomplished by a system of triage in which 
medical professionals determine in each instance whether or not, what type, and 
how much medical care each patient should receive. The force of both the pro and 
con sides of this debate is mitigated somewhat by the fact of extensive medical 
I These have been discussed frequently in the literature. An excellent early discussion is that of  
Havighurst  (1970). Luft  (1978b) presents an interesting analysis of  the effects of  these incentives on use of  
preventive services. 
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insurance coverage and the resultant increases in demand due to the lack of  out-of- 
pocket financial responsibility for insured services. 
The incentives in fee-for-service can influence providers as well as consumers. 
Providers have few disincentives, and may have positive incentives, to overprescribe 
medical goods and services (e.g. Schroeder and Showstack, 1978). Of  critical 
importance is the fact that as agents for their patients' demand, physicians make 
consumption decisions, yet usually they bear no financial responsibility for resultant 
use of  goods and services. That burden is borne by the patients and by third-party 
insurers. Insofar as increased consumption translates into iffcreased income, 
providers have a positive economic incentive to encourage consumption. 
Presumably the patient cannot distinguish needed consumption from that which is 
largely income-augmenting for the provider. To the extent that patients are well 
insured, they may not care. 
A tendency towards excessive use of  resources by physicians is not motivated 
exclusively nor even necessarily primarily by greed. The desire to deliver "Cadillac 
care"  is partly a response to the physician-patient trust relationship. "[T]he soci'al 
obligation for best practice is part of  the commodity the physician sells . . . .  The 
safest course to take to avoid not being a true agent is to give the socially prescribed 
'best '  treatment of the day. Compromise in quality, even for the purpose of  saving 
the patient money, is to risk an imputation of  failure to live up to the social bond"  
(Arrow, 1963). Medical ethics may encourage excessive use of  resources; the 
economic environment may permit it. 
"Neutra l i ty"  of  fee-for-service for the physician is seen in the growing practice of 
defensive medicine. Such procedures as skull X-rays following a head injury are 
routinely performed by physicians who recognize their limited medical value but 
order them to cover themselves against malpractice charges (Office of  Technology 
Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1978). When the costs of such procedures can be easily 
passed on, there is no economic incentive to restrict resource consumption to 
procedures of demonstrable value. 
An indirect fee-for-service incentive effect relates to the predominant mode of  
insurance: most present-day insurance provides fuller coverage for hospitalized 
patient care than it does for ambulatory care. This is based on the belief that the 
sorts of  care one would seek in an ambulatory setting are likely to be more 
discretionary--that  is, more sensitive to pr ice-- than care for which hospitalization 
is appropriate. Thus, the structure of  insurance provides an incentive for patients to 
be hospitalized rather than be treated in the cheaper ambulatory setting, which 
would often be at least as adequate. This is generally assumed to have had a 
deleterious effect on the containment of  medical care costs. 
Finally, consider how the system of  fee-for-service relates to the supply of  and 
demand for health education. It is clear that, while personal habits and life style are 
of  fundamental importance in determining health, millions of people engage in 
potentially self-destructive habits. For many, such behavior is knowingly 
undertaken; for these people, the consumption value of  the habit may exceed its 
dangers. For others, the habits represent ignorance. In either case, one must ask 
whether or not there is a significant demand for health education. Certainly there is 
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little push to supply health education activities commercially. At the theoretical 
level, the medical profession actually confronts a disincentive to promoting 
healthful habits and lifes styles: to the extent that it succeeds, it reduces the number 
of patients presenting themselves with medical complaints. Thus the economic 
factor may encourage the treatment of  illness rather than the promotion of  health. 
Economic Incentives in Prepayment 
Advocates of  prepayment claim that it addresses both sets of undesirable incentives 
associated with fee-for-service: those affecting consumers and those affecting 
providers. 
For consumers, prepayment eliminates or substantially reduces the out-of-pocket 
financial barrier to seeking care (the latter if a small visit co-payment is charged or if 
transportation or other related costs are a factor). As noted above, some observers, 
especially many economists, fear that this sows the seeds of  overutilization by 
consumers. Prepayment advocates respond that providers are best equipped to 
determine what constitutes desirable utilization. This is most easily achieved by 
encouraging consumers to present themselves to lower-echelon health professionals 
who filter them to the appropriate level of  care. Overutilization is protected against 
by a system of  triage, so that truly excessive demand is restricted to the low-cost 
point of  entry. (There are additional means of discouraging excess demand. For 
example, nonpecuniary costs, such as increased waiting time, can be imposed on 
patients.) 
For providers, the incentive associated with prepayment by itself is toward 
underutilization. Under prepayment, marginal resource consumption simply adds to 
the cost of  operating the HMO; the expense is not passed on to the patients (though, 
of  course, it might affect membership charges in later years). Thus, additional 
resource consumption simply reduces the HMO's  net revenues and consequently the 
partners'  incomes. 2 However, the incentive for providers to underutilize resources is 
offset by two economic considerations: if underutilization results in observably poor 
health care, the HMO will lose members and may not be able to attract new 
members. The organization's survival depends on its having a presentable image. 
Secondly, the HMO is responsible for its members'  medical care throughout the 
period they remain members. If insufficient care in the current year results in a more 
serious illness or disability in later years, the HMO may be saddled with large 
expenses which were preventable. Thus the providers' economic incentive is to 
minimize discounted resource consumption expenses over time. That may well mean 
that incurring a relatively small expense today is likely to he profit-maximizing 
behavior for the HMO In the long run. 
Similarly, the HMO has an incentive to undertake health education and to 
encourage primary and preventive care to the extent that such activities decrease the 
later incidence of  those types of  morbidity and disability which require expensive 
2 For the individual medical decision maker, this incentive diminishes as the number of partners rises, 
since the marginal cost of that individual's additional resource consumption is spread over larger 
numbers of people. 
124 
medical care. In theory, the HMO would weigh the current cost of preventive 
activities against the discounted value of the expected medical costs which could be 
averted in the future (the latter constituting the benefits of the preventive activities) 
and undertake activities which demonstrated positive net benefits. 
Despite its many attractions, from a theoretical point of view prepayment includes 
some perverse economic incentives. While these incentives are checked somewhat by 
HMOs' members or prospective members observing the results of inadequate care, 
consumers' ability to observe negative health outcomes and associate them with 
inadequate care is restricted by their knowledge and by the time frame involved. 
Even if such observation is occasionally possible, the direct economic incentive to 
providers remains nonoptimal. The perverse incentives are: 
(a) Prepayment discourages treatment which will have the effect of keeping 
someone alive who will require long-term medical care. For example, given a patient 
with end-stage renal disease, the prepayment incentive by itself (i.e. taken apart 
from humanitarian considerations) favors letting the patient die rather than placing 
the patient on renal dialysis, an expensive procedure which could keep the patient 
alive (but on dialysis) for years. 
(b) More generally, and less dramatically, if medical care can prevent premature 
mortality, it adds to the future pool of the elderly for whom the providers will be 
responsible, and the elderly require more care than younger people. In this context, 
with the provider having long-term responsibility for patients' care, prepayment 
does not encourage the medical promotion of longevity. 
(c) Prepayment discourages treatment which will prevent later morbidity or 
disability whose primary costs are nonmedical, i.e. costs associated with suffering or 
incapacity. For example, a physician's failure to set (or poor setting of) a leg bone 
fracture can result in an arthritic condition later in the patient's life. The chief costs 
associated with this condition would be both nonpecuniary (pain and possibly a 
limp) and pecuniary (e.g. additional housekeeping assistance) but in neither case 
medical. The financial incentive in prepayment encourages effective current 
treatment only to prevent significant later medical costs which the HMO will have to 
absorb. 
(d) Similarly, prepayment discourages health education which has beneficial 
health effects which do not significantly decrease later medical costs and may 
actually add to such costs at the same time that they increase people's longevity and 
sense of well-being. 
The intent of the proposal in the next section is to correct these undesirable 
incentives and strengthen the sound foundation of the prepayment concept. 
A Health Maintenance Insurance Package 
While no one has developed a completely satisfactory definition of health, it is clear 
that two major components of health are freedom from disability and morbidity, 
and the fact of life itself--freedom from death for as long as life can be enjoyable. 
Achieving these conditions constitutes health maintenance; the incentives in the 
HMO should encourage this. The incentives should not bias the HMO in favor of 
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preventing only health problems with significant associated medical expense, 
ignoring those that involve little medical care. Certainly there should be no positive 
financial incentive to let medically dependent patients die. 
An organization will be encouraged to achieve true health maintenance if it is 
rewarded financially for producing health, not simply for avoiding medical 
conditions. The proposal here is to improve the HMO's incentive structure by 
having it offer consumers comprehensive health maintenance insurance (HMI), 
rather than the comprehensive medical insurance which it currently provides. This 
can be realized by offering an insurance package which includes: 
9 comprehensive medical insurance (the current HMO insurance) 
9 disability/morbidity insurance 
9 life insurance 
Under such an insurance plan, the owners of the HMO would profit from their 
members' living long lives free from illness and disabling conditions, and not simply 
free of conditions requiring a great deal of medical care. Under the present system, 
theoretically the fin~ancial inducement is to compare the cost of a current treatment 
with the discounted expected cost of later treatment which would result from failure 
to treat today (i.e. the discounted cost of later treatment weighted by the probability 
that later treatment will be required due to the absence of treatment today). Current 
and possible future treatment are the alternatives. If the former is cheaper than the 
latter, economic considerations favor treating the patient today; if the relationship is 
the opposite, the economic incentive recommends foregoing treatment today and 
accepting the risk that treatment will be required in later years. 
But the true health cost of this problem is not simply the medical cost. Suppose 
that the failure to treat a condition today does eventually result in a complication 
requiring medical treatment. Suppose further that associated with the complication 
or with the later treatment is a period of morbidity or disability during which the 
patient is incapacitated and/or experiences suffering. This is of no direct economic 
concern to current HMOs. However, if the HMOs were financially liable for the 
morbidity or disability, they would then include this cost in their treatment decision 
calculus. That is, other things being equal, physicians would be more likely to treat 
patients today rather than later because the true costs of the later complication are 
greater than the medical costs alone. Of course, the opposite situation is also 
possible: inclusion of disability~morbidity costs might recommend postponing 
treatment if current treatment was the source of disability (for example, the patient's 
being bedridden following an operation). Again, however, this accurately reflects 
consideration of all of the true costs of treatment. 
Under health maintenance insurance, the decision of whether or not to administer 
life-maintaining therapy which may continue until the patient's death is no longer a 
battle between the physician's conscience and the financial realities of continued 
treatment. Now a decision not to administer therapy--hence to allow the patient to 
die--also involves immediate payment of a life insurance policy to the patient's 
beneficiaries. Treatment which prolongs life postpones the burden of the life 
insurance; if the policy is for term insurance, life-maintaining treatment decreases 
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the face value of  the death payment as well. It is conceivable that this structure of  
financial responsibility would make long-term treatment the HMO's  profit- 
maximizing strategy. Even if it does not, at least the provider's conscience may find 
an ally in the life insurance liability. The economic incentive is thereby tailored more 
closely to the humanitarian objective. 
In general, the addition of life and disability/morbidity insurance to the HMO's  
package means that the organization has more incentive to be concerned with 
members'  total health and not simply their medical health. Theoretically, 
consequences of  HMI include the following: 
(a) Given the client population, the HMO has a greater inducement to learn the 
true value of such activities as health education and primary and preventive care. 
The incentive to learn the link between these activities and future medical needs is 
strengthened, and the HMO has the additional incentive of  undertaking activities 
which have nonmedical health rewards. In effect, health maintenance insurance 
would subject a number of conjectures about primary and preventive care to the 
rigors of  a market test. (The current HMO setting does the same, though again with 
a medical bias. HMI strengthens the incentive to discover the relationships, since 
more costs are involved.) 
(b) Being financially responsible for members'  total health reduces the HMO's  
incentive to take shortcuts in the provision of useful medical care. 
(c) Proponents of  HMOs argue that prepayment and comprehensive care will 
restore competition to the medical marketplace, and that this will have the effect of  
encouraging greater efficiency (Ellwood et al., 1971; Enthoven, 1977). The tendency 
toward competition would seem to be strengthened by the inclusion of  life and 
disability/morbidity insurance in the HMO package: the package is more 
comprehensive than that offered by the current HMO, hence it is also more 
expensive. Presumably, consumers will shop more carefully when the commodity 
involved is as financially significant as this package would be. Note again, however, 
that there are no incentives for the HMO to cut corners in the provision of care. The 
profitable HMO will be the efficient provider of health maintenance services. This 
will be the organization which can expect minimum average total costs and hence the 
greatest margin between revenues and expenditures. 
Implementing Health Maintenance Insurance 
The principle of  health maintenance insurance could be put into practice in several 
ways. First, of  course, a few HMOs might actually adopt the practice. To do so, an 
HMO would have to have a critical mass of  membership, since insurance requires a 
large population to smooth out risk. Today's  largest HMOs would have the 
minimum requisite membership. Smaller HMOs could band together for insurance 
purposes while continuing to provide decentralized patient care. 
Big firms and labor unions could be implementing HMI right now. They are 
concerned with each of its components--medical ,  life, and disability insurance. 
Clearly it is in the mutual interest of management and labor to seek an efficient 
health care package, one which delivers the benefits desired by labor at the low cost 
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desired by both management and the unions. This could be achieved either by 
working with a single HMI provider/insurer or by contracting for medical care 
coverage which, because of its preventive care aspects, would induce life insurers to 
lower their premiums to the group. As is noted below, the limited attention devoted 
in contract negotiations to the interrelationships among medical, disability, and life 
insurances is perhaps a telling comment about the perceived connection between 
medical care and morbidity and mortality outcomes. 
A plausible implementation of the HMI principle is through decentralized market 
forces. In a world of perfectly competitive insurance companies and HMOs, the 
former would rate the latter and would scale life and disability insurance premiums 
accordingly. That is, if the members of HMOs of type A experienced less morbidity 
and mortality than the members of HMOs of type B, members of type A HMOs 
would pay commensurately less for life and disability insurance. Assuming that they 
served similar populations, type B organizations would be forced by competitive 
pressures to restructure their health care activities to imitate their more successful 
rivals. Of course, both the insurance business and the medical care delivery business 
are far from the competitive ideal. Still, if truly significant differences in health 
status do emerge from different types of delivery organizations, several insurance 
companies can be expected to introduce differential premiums. Where differences in 
outcomes are substantial, such differences are generally ultimately reflected in 
premiums. Consider, for example, "good driver disc.ounts" on auto insurance and 
lower life insurance rates for nonsmokers. The insurance market may adjust slowly, 
and medical care delivery organizations may respond at least as slowly, but as 
evidence accumulates on variations in morbidity and mortality, competitive market 
pressures can be expected to lead the system in the right direction. 
Any application of the HMI principle--within a single HMO, through union 
benefit packages, or through insurance ratings of HMOs by independent insurance 
firms--would benefit from partial or complete resolution of a number of very 
difficult questions. For example, how does one measure morbidity and disability? 
How are their true costs to be assessed? (Workmen's compensation and similar 
plans offer partial but not wholly satisfactory answers.) How does one evaluate 
relative programmatic effectiveness in the face of significant differences in the 
socioeconomic and demographic composition of different HMOs? (Many questions 
such as these are equally germane to consideration of today's HMOs.) Further, 
implementation of health maintenance insurance by a single organization--an HMO 
providing the complete insurance package--would necessitate clarification of state 
insurance laws and answers to questions such as, what happens to a person's health 
maintenance coverage when the person moves? Would all members of an HMO, 
including children, be permitted or compelled to carry all of the insurance 
components of HMI? And so on. 
Conclusion 
Health maintenance insurance is unlikely to find widespread acceptance in practice 
in the near future. In addition to the deterrents enumerated above, there are few 
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competitive pressures to bring it about. Indeed, both professional resistance and 
government regulation serve as powerful anticompetitive constraints on innovation 
in medical care delivery and financing (Havighurst, 1977). And, as regards the 
single-organization approach, many health professionals would consider the HMO's 
going (further) into business to be distasteful. However, simply enunciating the 
principle can be of value. The principle behind HMI points to conceptual 
inadequacies in the economic incentive structure of current HMOs; it emphasizes the 
distinction, too often ignored, between medical care and health care; and it 
illuminates the role that economic incentives might play in encouraging providers 
both to seek new methods of promoting health and to attempt to alter their 
members' unhealthful habits. 
One might acknowledge the theoretical appeal of HMI but find its practical 
importance limited. The economic incentives implicit in prepayment may not be 
theoretically optimal, this line of thought runs, but medical and humanitarian 
considerations dominate economic factors when the latter deviate from the ideal; in 
practice, HMOs a r e  concerned with the preservation and enhancement of health; 
their behavior is directed toward true health maintenance. 
Obviously, this is an empirical question, one which cannot be adequately 
answered with the paucity of existing understanding of the effects of medical care 
and health behavior on health status. However, recent empirical evidence challenges 
the contention that HMOs employ preventive care procedures more often than the 
fee-for-service system (Gaus et al., 1976; Luft, 1978b) and theoretical work other 
than the present paper has been offered to explain why HMOs might underproduce 
preventive care (Finkle, 1975). Perhaps the most significant evidence to date is that 
alluded to earlier, namely the indifference of the marketplace: life insurers are not 
offering lower premiums to members of HMOs, suggesting that insurers do not 
currently perceive a significant relationship between HMO care and lifespan; and 
union and management contract negotiators rarely make a direct connection 
between medical coverage and life and disability insurance, despite the substantial 
economic incentives to both groups to reduce the cost of fringe benefits. To be sure, 
these facts might simply reflect noncompetitiveness or slowness of adjustment in 
these markets; alternatively, the relevant decision makers might be myopic, ill- 
informed, or conservative. But the fact remains that HMOs have not reduced the 
cost of life insurance, and labor contract negotiators have evidenced relatively little 
faith in the idea that medical care can be restructured to significantly combat 
mortality and morbidity. 
It might be argued that health maintenance insurance is a more drastic departure 
from the standard HMO model than is necessary. Specific health education and 
medical practices which are demonstrably effective could be promoted by a system 
of direct bonuses to providers, as is currently done in Britain's National Health 
Service. However, the need for activity-specific bonuses points to deficiencies in the 
existing incentive structure. Implicit in health maintenance is a similar set of bonuses 
possibly covering a larger number of such activities. Furthermore, HMI identifies 
cost-effective activities, not simply "effective" ones, and scales the implicit bonus 
for each closer to its true value than does an arbitrarily established figure. Of 
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perhaps greater importance, HMI  encourages medical managers to seek out new 
means of  promoting health. A defined set of  activity-specific bonuses offers no 
comparable incentive. 
Both in theory and in practice, HMOs seem to represent a significant step in the 
direction of  more efficient delivery of  medical care. Unlike fee-for-service, 
prepayment introduces incentives for providers to be cost conscious in their 
prescribing and delivery of  care. Empirical studies repeatedly report lower than 
average rates of  surgery and hospitalization for H M O  members (e.g. Weil, 1976; 
Luft,  1978a). The attractiveness of  health maintenance insurance is that the 
substantial amounts of  money involved in disability and life insurance--and hence 
in H M I - - w o u l d  place a significant new pressure on providers to search for truly 
effective means of  preventing disability, morbidity, and premature death. It seems 
only logical that HMOs would develop more concern for true health maintenance if 
they bid for the health dollar, and not simply for the medical care dollar. Health 
maintenance insurance would make the economic incentive structure of  the H M O  
more compatible with the humanitarian considerations which everyone would like to 
motivate the delivery of personal health care. 
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